Observing Election Processing
Version 4/1/2026
Contents
AA.
Immediately before elections
AB.
Logic+accuracy tests (LAT)
C.
Election machines (voting, pollbook)
G.
Processing after election night★
· Ordinary citizens can watch
election processing at the elections office, and often online. Each state has
its own rules.
· By observing, you show staff
that people care, you encourage better procedures, and you can tell others how
trustworthy the results are.
· Watch as much as you can.
Even if you don't know what the process should look like, watching will teach
you. Smile and introduce yourself. Workers have a hard enough job without being
frowned at. Stay cool. If you raise your voice or get aggressive, you’ll be
thrown out and not see what you need to see. Don’t give them any reason to
throw you out.
· Find allies in your state. Send suggestions to admin@VoteWell.net
· Tips on what to watch for
That's all you really need to start. There's extra information below, if you have time, including a choice of forms if you want to take notes.
Here are steps in the process. Try to watch at least a little of each step.
1.
Testing
some or all equipment for each election
2.
Picking
up, tracking, verifying envelopes & ballots from USPS, drop boxes &
polling places
3.
Processing
accepted ballots & cures of rejected ballots & transferring counts to
web
4.
Auditing
any aspects of election, and certifying all the work to the state and public
If you see anything that looks odd, ask which official to talk to. Even if you don’t understand, check with a more experienced organization or candidates before deciding there’s a problem. If you do think there’s a problem after getting explanations, tell local organizations, candidates, 866-our vote (which is a national team of election lawyers). Election workers who want to report something wrong can get help from WhistleblowerAid.org. The US government has a form (p.7).
Check what your state allows. Then learn from the local election office website, then ask staff only the most important remaining questions. Be reasonable, respectful, nice. Build an alliance with staff and reporters for better elections. Some offices post announcements inside their office.
1. 40
states
require advance accreditation for some steps, so check the rules early. Qualifications vary.
Some states require accreditation to watch centralized vote processing; some
don't.
2. Which steps of election
processing are open to public? Only WV does not allow
poll watching, but even there, election night counting, canvassing and 3% hand
counts are done in meetings of the County Commission, open to the public.
3. Have schedules been
announced? When will they be? If the schedule and meetings are not online, ask
for that. Calls show that people care. Summary of state
schedules
4. Can central processing and
election board meetings be observed online? If online, use sharpest possible
video monitor. Where can you get minutes of past meetings? Election board
meetings are important and many places can webcast them.
5. In big rooms are binoculars
allowed?
6. Do they restrict the colors
of observers' pens, to prevent or identify source of stray marks?
7. If your area still needs poll
workers or other temporary staff, consider applying. You won't see as widely as
observers, but you can become very familiar with the process and help it work.
8. Maybe you can attend their training for poll workers or signature verification? Especially if it is online. Ask for manuals, which also may be online. If you find manuals online, add them to the list.
9. They may give you a visitor badge. You can also wear your own, so everyone knows you’re an observer, not a worker.
1. Find others in your state who observe elections,
to share the work and help each other report good and bad findings to
officials, reporters, and wherever they will make a difference. Search on web
for allied poll-watching groups, ask friends, candidates, Election Verification Network,
other civic groups, unions, business groups, political parties.
2. Publicize the schedule of
observable events to people and groups you know. No one can watch everything.
Starred items below may be most important. Here are important things to watch for, no matter
when you go.
3. Ask candidates to have
volunteers observe everything.
4. Many states allow more access for
partisan observers. Decide whether to sign up with a candidate to be on their
observer team. ballotpedia.org/Sample_Ballot_Lookup
5. Publicize 866-our-vote and/or your
local group to report problems.
6. If you're a lawyer, is there
a state judge on call for election
issues? Can you have templates ready if needed?
7. When you observe, introduce
yourself to as many staff and observers as possible, try to write down their
names and sketch the layout of the room, to help your memory later.
Great observation stories from Colorado: http://electionquality.com/observed_elections/
Issues in Utah which observers could have caught, and observers from legislative auditor’s office did observe
Stories from CO, GA, NC on video ($2 for lifetime access):
15:30 Loading electronic files from polling places by 1 person instead of 2
17:00 Need to object to unreasonable restrictions on observers
22:30 Created manual to tell police the public’s rights at election offices
23:55 Taking a printout of short section of law allowing public observation; helps in some offices
26:00 Talking to staffer in charge of random selection gradually improved what he did
31:30 Colorado changed from public random selection to a video which could be non-random or could have been recorded before the election
32:30 Usually see something wrong, if not fixed may need to tell candidates
33:10 Los Angeles staff opening vote by mail envelopes could see voter’s name and votes. Speaking to boss led to putting envelopes with name down so no longer seen by staff
40:36 Hard to see in big room
44:04 A strategy is to watch one ballot or batch moving through a big room, to be sure of every step. Noticed envelopes had been opened in secret, & weren’t being scanned. Took 5 months to get state to instruct counties that ballots must be scanned at same meeting when envelopes were opened
45:50 In Cobb County GA, 2020 saw that hand counts being entered in computer to add them up had such slow computer response staff could not tell if entered right.
48:17 In Fulton county, GA, 2020 not allowed to watch counts being entered in computer
48:55 Recommend Pentax Papilio binoculars to see work a few feet away better as well as distant
50:56 Try to get phone numbers of officials to call about problems (e.g. ballots sorted in wrong piles)
51:36 Team interpreting marks on electronic images of ballots where computer had trouble interpreting marks. Some marks appeared without indication whether computer interpreted mark at all. Turns out computer had ignored these marks. State has refused to adjust brightness control in scanners which can solve the issue. Still in court on this & other issues
56:20 Observers can’t prepare for much of what you see; always new issues. Keep your eyes open, think, ask persistently
56:45 Let staff know that observers are witnesses who can help them by vouching for what goes well
59:15 If you can find poll worker training & manuals for your area, you’ll see what workers are told (not available for central office processes)
59:44 Ask staff if you can attend wrapup meeting where staff discuss lessons learned from each election
1:00:30 Being concerned about election process is a good thing, but coming in with hostile attitude or chip on a shoulder does not lead to better work
Compare state rules on what people can watch: and who can watch voting (other aspects may have similar eligibility) https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watcher-qualifications.aspx
Partial list of state handbooks: https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/poll-watchers
Observers quell rumors: https://www.lwv.org/blog/observing-elections-and-protecting-voters-wisconsin
Republicans' observers: https://www.facebook.com/officialteamtrump/videos/264058754952383
Democrats' observers: https://arlingtondemocrats.org/start-making-difference-now/voter-protection/
Florida precinct watchers' checklists and training: http://www.ffec.org/election-monitoring-audits/
California observation suggestions & links in 2012: https://countedascast.org/monitoring-elections/
California election workers fearing hostile observers in 2024: https://calmatters.org/politics/2024/11/shasta-county-election-workers
Sample schedule: https://sfelections.sfgov.org/observe-election-process
Election security issues: https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/Argonne-NL-2012-Suggestions-for-Better-Election-Security.pdf
US government on insider risks
Many places let people observe online without being in public and observe somewhere they don’t live. Often they keep recordings of past elections posted.
·
Texas requires 24/7 webcasts in counties over
100,000 people (Texas dates)
·
https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/advisory2022-10.shtml
·
kxan.com/news/your-local-election-hq/how-to-watch-vote-counting-in-texas/
·
https://www.fox7austin.com/news/how-to-live-stream-from-texas-election-offices
·
Arizona
requires webcasts in all counties (Arizona dates)
·
https://coppercourier.com/2020/10/16/livestream-election-ballot-counting-arizona/
·
Individual
counties
·
https://www.lavote.gov/home/voting-elections/current-elections/live-feed
(California dates)
§ https://washoelife.washoecounty.gov/washoe-county/washoe-county-launches-livestream-video-of-ballot-room-for-duration-of-presidential-preference-primary/
(Nevada dates)
§ https://adacounty.id.gov/elections/ballot-cameras/
(Idaho dates)
§ kingcounty.gov/en/dept/elections/about-king-county/about-king-county-elections/security-and-accountability/watch-us-in-action
(Washington state dates)
·
2020
articles
·
www.governing.com/now/live-on-webcams-election-officials-count-2020-ballots.html
had zoom list in 2020
·
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/04/1011648/livestream-vote-counts-are-here-to-stay
·
In
2020, South Korea livestreamed "the close of voting and the storing of the
voted ballots; the preparation and beginning of counting; the counting process
as it was progressing; and the close of the vote counting... South Korea’s
efforts to expand election observation opportunities for its 2020 elections
made it easier for its courts, experts, and the broader public to counter and
dispel false election narratives." https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/election-lessons/
You can print the short form at bottom to note names, times, events. This will help you remember what you see, to discuss with others. Signature may let lawyers use it under evidence Rule 803(5).
Even if you don't know what the people you watch should be doing, watching will teach you. Ask whom you should approach if you see something off, so you don't interrupt the workers and process.
1. What changes in law does the
election office want?
2. Destroying old ballots and
erasing old electronic media after 22 months. (pages 75-79 of https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download
"Originals must be retained" for 22 months under federal law)
3. Find the advertisements for
printing, mailing and election machine contractors ("request for
proposals" and contract decisions, months ahead).
4. Get copies of contracts. Just
ask. If they resist, state laws on open records are summarized at https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/
You can get help submitting and tracking requests at: https://www.muckrock.com/faq/#general
5. Who has keys to storage of
election machines?
6. Attend public presentations,
if any.
1.
Very
complete list from Michigan is at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1M-q5vAV5jVfyjGamQj2mfiUHRtBwFA1r/view
2.
Public
meeting to randomize order of candidates.
3.
When
will designs be reviewed for ballots and envelopes? You may want to offer
suggestions.
4.
How
do they proofread the ballots?
5.
Mailings
of information to voters, if any.
6.
When
will training material for temporary staff be updated? You may want to offer
suggestions.
7.
When
are temporary staff hired?
8.
Can
you get manuals for poll workers & other staff. Just ask. If they resist,
state laws on open records are summarized at https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/
You can get help submitting and tracking requests at: https://www.muckrock.com/faq/#general
9.
Can
you attend training for temporary central staff and poll workers?
10.
Loading
ballot definitions into election machines. Done by staff or vendor?
11.
See
also Chain of Custody section H, and check locks, cameras, seal specifications,
seal log designs
Specialized form if you wish
1. Test includes hand-marked and
machine-marked ballots if jurisdiction allows both?
a) BMD machines should each be
tested with each data entry mode (touch, audio, sip+puff,
etc.) to check correct operation.
2.
Tests
use official ballots from printing company and from ballot-on-demand printers
if jurisdiction allows both, not perfect PDFs from office printer?
3.
Tests
include overvotes and undervotes?
4.
Tests
that the machine ignores faint stray marks?
5.
Test
procedure includes inserting ballots in all four orientations
(top/bottom/front/back)?
6.
Tests
all candidates, with a different number of votes for each to identify switched
tallies? For example 3 ballots for Bush, 2 for Gore, 1 for Nader, will show if
machine switches their tallies.
7.
Can
observers see and get copies of test ballots? See results?
8.
Model
numbers of machines tested?
9.
Do
machines have stickers saying certified by EAC (not required in most states,
but if so, you can check later if they’re true)
10.
Is
every machine tested with every style of ballot that it needs to handle?
11.
Do
staff write down any problems (purpose is to find mistakes in programming and
mechanical problems)? CA example. Can you get
the reports by asking, or by public records requests?
12.
2022
Comparison
of
state rules. It lists criteria & where each state stands:
Procedural Criteria for Logic & Accuracy Tests
2. Rules and Transparency (5
points).
1. RT1 (1.5 pts): Detailed or
step-by-step guidelines received full credit, and general laws or policies
received half credit.
2. RT2 (1.0 pts): The document
is readily available, e.g., via the state’s website.
3. RT3 (1.5 pts): Some testing
is open to the public, candidates/parties, journalists.
4. RT4 (1.0 pts): Local
jurisdictions have latitude to exceed baseline requirements.
3. Scope of Testing (5 points).
1. ST1 (2.0 pts): All voting
machines/scanners must be tested before each election.
2. ST2 (1.0 pts): All devices
must be tested at a public event before each election.
3. ST3 (2.0 pts): All devices
must be tested with every applicable ballot design.
Functional Criteria for Logic & Accuracy Tests
4. Basic Protections (4 points).
1. BP1 (1.0 pts): All choices
receive at least one valid vote during testing.
2. BP2 (3.0 pts): No two choices
in a contest receive the same number of votes.
5. Overvote Protection (2
points)
1. OP1 (0.5 pts): At least one
overvoted ballot is cast during testing.
2. OP2 (1.5 pts): For each
contest c, a test deck includes a ballot with nc
selections and one with nc+1 selections, where nc is
the permitted number of selections.
6. Nondeterministic Testing (4
points). For stronger protection against deliberate errors, attackers should be
unable to predict how the test deck is marked.
1. ND1 (1.0 pts): Public
observers are allowed to arbitrarily mark and cast ballots.
2. ND2 (3.0 pts): Some ballots
must be marked using a source of randomness.
References,
for Logic & Accuracy Tests
1. 2006 Washburn guide for test decks
2. 2023 Manual from PA
3. 2024 Walker (Votebeat) article on implementation failures
in PA
4. 2024 Elections Group guide to
whole process
5. 2024 Crimmins, Halderman, Sturt critique in parts 1-2 of a paper
“A ‘hash’... is a… string of numbers and letters generated from a mathematical algorithm and a… file.... This generated string is unique to the file being hashed.”
“Your voting system vendor has instructions for
generating hashes from your voting system and the voting system equipment, and
comparing them with the trusted hashes.” “If the two do not match,you
need to investigate why... At minimum,before you
conduct an election on that equipment, be sure to reinstall the software from a
trusted source.” “Hashing every individual voting device before each election
may not be feasible, but you should perform a hash validation of a
representative sample of your voting system equipment.”
“Some states have specific requirements for testing and frequency. In some states, hash testing is voluntary… Ideally, the staff at each jurisdiction should understand their equipment and systems well enough to perform local testing… Adding third parties to chain of custody may create actual or perceived security vulnerabilities.”
“modern computers have many layers underneath what you examine. But mainly, if a hacker can corrupt the vote-tallying software, perhaps they can corrupt the hash-generating function as well… ES&S has bugs in their hash-code checker.”
Hart has BIOS check the operating system and software.
Appel suggests
(pp.25-28) “hash all the static partitions” to check that a bad BIOS hasn’t
changed the operating system, on a random sample of machines.
“a number of hash checks conducted on ES&S software failed verification, but ES&S withheld this information from the secretary of state’s office because it deemed the failures to be insignificant.”
Happens in CA, NY, PA (only in Delaware County), TX (form), VA. (add as discovered)
1. Which machines were tested? If not all, were they randomly selected? How much time would it take to test all?
2. Who tested them?
3. Did they use testing software already inside the machine? If not, what?
4. Can you get the reports by asking, or by public records requests?
5. What kinds and how many locks and seals protect machines from changes until the election is over? Can you buy copies of the locks and seals to test?
1.
Processing
initial requests, if any
2.
Processing
requests for replacement ballots
3.
Printing,
addressing and mailing ballots (usually done by contractors; you can ask for
the contract)
4.
Receiving ballots, storage locations? Who has keys overnight? Who
watches security cameras? ★
a)
Article
on issues with storage: http://losspreventionmedia.com/insider/retail-security/physical-security-threats-and-vulnerabilities/
b)
Procedures
& contracts to log mailed ballots: https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject%3Aabsentee-ballots-logs--c-212840%20
c)
Procedures
to process mailed ballots: https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject%3Aabsentee-ballot-processin-212581%20
5.
Cameras
or staff at drop boxes? You can observe from a distance, unobtrusively, without
wearing or giving campaign material or bothering voters. Article on drop boxes: https://electionsgroup.com/assets/Ballot%20Drop%20Box%20Guide.pdf
6.
Emptying
drop boxes and delivering to central site. Numbered seals? Articles on issues
with seals: https://alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug12/Choose_Use_Seals.html https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
Procedures: https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject%3Aelection-drop-boxes-211539%20
7.
Computer-checking
signatures
8.
Hand-checking
signatures (specialized form if you wish)
9.
Supervisor
review of initial hand rejections. This is final, smallest step, so easiest to
observe.★
10.
Setting
aside rejected envelopes for voters to cure, if your state does so. Sending
cure notices to voters. Handling voter responses in person and by mail.
11.
Reviewing
late arrivals for postmarks
12.
Pulling
ballots from accepted envelopes. Are pens, briefcases, bags forbidden? Do they
restrict observers' pens? How do they handle envelope with more than one
ballot?
13.
Copying
damaged ballots so they can go through ballot scanners for counting★
14.
Sending
and receiving UOCAVA (military) + remote disability ballots. All offices accept
military ballots by email or fax on last days, a few let people with
disabilities submit online. https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/internet-voting.aspx#Table
15.
Copying
UOCAVA+disability voter choices onto scannable
ballots
16.
Sorting
absentee ballots by precinct, if done
17.
Scanning
and tallying absentee ballots. Are pens, briefcases, bags forbidden? ★
1. Delivery of election machines
and blank ballot papers to polling places:
a) Who delivers? When are pick
up & delivery? Can people observe?
b) Could the polling place owner
or anyone else access the machines and papers before the poll opens?★
2. Picking up machines from
polling places
a) Do two people transport the
machines and/or computer media to central office?
1.
Who
has keys? numbered seals? Are there
passwords on different machines? Where are they kept?
2.
General
observation. If significant problem or voters say machines switched their vote
(staff may think voter error), report to a central group in your jurisdiction
and/or 866-our-vote, so they
can see if there's a pattern.
3.
Are
campaigns, press, or outsiders interfering with voters outside? Is anyone doing an exit poll
outside?
4.
Is
law enforcement or ICE around inside or outside?
5.
Opening
and closing each day
1.
Arrival
time of poll workers, open to public? Ballot boxes empty? Ballots+machines
arrive with seals? Machines showing zero?
2.
General
observation. If significant problem or voters say machines switched their vote
(staff may think voter error), report to a central group in your jurisdiction
and/or 866-our-vote, so they
can see if there's a pattern.
3.
Watch
for malfunctions of machines, memory devices, access by vendors
4.
If
you want to count voters checking in at some point in the day, you might ask pollworkers before and after you start how many voters
they've checked in, to be sure their records are growing in line with the
arriving voters.
5.
Are
campaigns, press, or outsiders interfering with voters outside? Is anyone doing an exit poll
outside?
6.
Write
down if there are uniformed police? ICE? Other law enforcement? Inside or
outside?
7.
Are
closing procedures well organized? Ask and write down how many provisional
ballots and ordinary ballots were issued. Poll workers track these numbers from
the sign-in book or poll book, not the voting system. They should be very close
to the number of votes. People can see decisions on provisional ballots in step
G1.
8.
Photograph
poll tape if tallied at precinct. There are ideas at https://www.protectourvotes.com/photo-finish/
and https://democracycounts.org/actual-vote/
and ValidateTheVoteUSA.org .
Check later whether totals in your photo match election day totals published
for that precinct.
9.
Carrying
ballots + memory cards from polling places to central office
1.
Is
there a practice session for election day or election night?
2.
Central
office handling requests from precincts on election morning and election day
3.
Copying
into central memory the memory devices from precincts, early voting, absentees,
UOCAVA, disability. Seals?
4.
How
do they prevent someone palming a new memory device into the system instead of
the true one?
5.
Scanning
and tallying ballots. How do they track groups of ballots to ensure each is
scanned once and only once?
6.
Watch
for malfunctions of machines, memory devices, access by vendors
7.
Whenever
staff have access to ballots, are purses, backpacks, etc. kept out of reach,
and black pens forbidden?
8.
When
a ballot jams or otherwise fails to read, where does it go next? How is the
rest of the batch handled?
9.
Re-reading
ballots in case of problems?
10.
Transferring
results to internet/public. How do they prevent the internet infecting the
central election machines?
11.
(At
home) Screen capture each time election results update. Every 45 minutes you
can save the page to https://wayback-api.archive.org/save
There are always rumors that some candidates' votes decrease, which should
never happen, though they may shift between mail, in-person, etc. when staff
correct errors. You can disprove (or prove) the rumors. You can also capture
video on phone or computer with Windows+G on Windows,
QuickTime on Mac, or other programs.
1.
Watch
for malfunctions of machines, memory devices, access by vendors.
2.
Processing
provisional ballots; Public decisions? Good reasons to accept or reject?
3.
When
the election board meets: Are all members present & paying attention?
Others present? Space & sound OK? Accessible? Start on time? Stick to
agenda? Length? Public comments? Adequate discussion & explanation?
Everyone acts courteously? (optional forms at end of LWV guide or use general
form at end of this document)
4.
Adjudicating
ballots with ambiguous votes, which the scanner set aside.
5.
Re-creating
by hand ballots which were torn or otherwise failed to go through scanner. Also
applies to voters who use Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB), which is
standard nationally, but doesn’t match any particular jurisdiction's ballot
format. . Should be teams of at least two, where both see original marks and
new ballot (1 person reading old ballot to 1 person who marks new ballot, has
no check on either). Team should write a number on each re-created ballot and
its original ballot, so they can be checked later. Is it possible to photo-copy
some damaged ballots onto paper of the correct size & weight to scan,
instead of hand-marking?
6.
Audit (checking machine
counts) if your area does one: selecting random sample, getting ballots from
storage, re-tallying them by hand? by machines? Votes visible to public? Hand tally sheets
published online?
a) https://verifiedvoting.org/publication/checking-the-paper-record-a-guide-for-public-oversight-of-tabulation-audits-2/ (specialized form if you wish)
7.
Certifying
the results. States vary.
8.
Boxing
ballots for storage, seals+keys? Map of state rules on access to ballots
and ballot images.
9.
Recount,
if any. This will be similar to steps F and G above. Details will depend on
state law, and will include close observation by the candidates involved in the
recount.
1.
When
staff open a sealed container, do they check seal number matches a seal log?
2.
When
staff seal a container, do they enter seal number in a seal log?
3.
How
is the seal log transported and secured?
4.
Ballot
reconciliation (usually before or during canvass meeting). Expect differences
of 1 to 3 ballots, from mis-counts by tired poll-workers
a) For each precinct do they
track number of election-day voters checked in = ballots in box + provisionals = in-person election results + rejected provisionals?
b) Similar checks for early
voting.
c) For mail & drop boxes, do
they track number of envelopes = mail results + rejected envelopes?
d) Do they report election day
separately from early voting and mail, for each precinct, so the counts can be
checked?
e) Can you get all these totals
for some or all precincts?
5. Locks on ballot storage?
(info on locks)
a) Number of locks with
different keys?
b) Who has those keys?
c) Are there electronic logs of
whose keycard or combination opens at what times?
d) Is there a unique entry code
for each person?
e) Are the logs public?
f) How secure from erasure and
alteration are those logs?
g) Is there literature on how
easy to pick this model of lock is? (All physical & electronic locks are
pickable, small and cheap ones usually easiest)
6. Seals on stored ballots?
(info on seals)
a) Is there literature on how
hard it is to remove and replace your seals without detection?
b) Is it possible to order extra
seals with the same numbers?
c) Can the item be opened
without damaging the seal (eg zip ties can be opened
by a knife point holding down the tab away from the indentations)
d) Can you get used seals or new
seals to check out?
7. Security cameras on ballot
storage? (info on cameras &
security equipment)
a)
Is
there literature on how hackable your security cameras are?
b)
When
did a security expert last examine the security cameras for hacking?
c)
Who
watches the security camera footage?
d)
Is
the security camera footage online?
8.
Security
on other election records, like seal logs, and precinct reports of how many
people voted?
a) (same questions as above)
9.
Does
the election system calculate hash values of ballot images, cast vote records,
and other electronic files? (A hash value is a fixed-length string of numbers
and letters generated from a mathematical algorithm and is unique to the file
being hashed, as defined in CISA ST04-018)
a) Are the hash values public?
b) Does anyone check if files
during the final canvass have the same hash values as originally calculated?
10. EAC advises, “Every election
office should have written chain of custody procedures available for public
inspection prior to every election.” Most offices don’t, but you can quote that
and ask. The rest of that EAC advice absurdly focuses on paper signatures, not
locks & guards.
More thorough tips on observing audits are at docs.google.com/document/d/11qSTJNZqfoPxG6HuRTf-Hw5euA4bG5QQEmlRuf34WAY/edit?tab=t.0
States have different methods of auditing. These steps apply:
1.
Do
they give the public the election system’s results for each batch before random
selection & audit, to prevent later changes? (rare)
2.
Selecting
random sample: Throwing dice is visibly fair.
Taking numbers from a bowl leaves doubt whether every item had one slip of
paper. Can you see all slips of paper? Picking by getting random numbers from a
computer program can be ok, but won’t convince doubters that program isn’t
hacked.
3.
The
most transparent is to pick items from a numbered list by throwing two or three
10-sided dice numbered 0-9, 00-90, and 000-900.
Can you get the numbered list to see that it's complete? You can ask a
few weeks ahead about their method & offer to order 10-sided dice,
delivered directly to office, if they’re open to that. Explanation: https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/dice-wote06.pdf
How California mis-uses dice is in the appendix of https://www.calvoter.org/sites/default/files/comments-regs-cvf-bc-ccc-vv-june302023.pdf
4.
Getting
ballots from storage: Can you watch, or do staff livestream their trips in
storage room? Does it happen as soon as sample is chosen, to avoid doubt about
them being changed? (both rare)
5.
Can
you see the entire paper flow to be clear everything which needs to be handled
is handled once, and goes on to storage? (common in small offices) Graphic of
good & bad visibility: https://californiaglobe.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ACROV_Review.jpg
6.
Retallying
paper ballots by machines? by hand? Each batch split between 2 teams so they
don’t know totals to match? Teams of 3 or 4 so 2 read & 2
tally?
7.
Votes
visible to public? (rare)
8.
Reading
totals from tally sheets is error-prone: Can you check? Copies for public?
(rare, but may be permitted in small & friendly offices)
9.
What
do they do when totals don’t match? ★
★ Starred items may be most important to observe. And watch for these, no matter when you go.
|
Notes on an Observer’s Shift: On back or new page, sketch room to remember it. Avoid black or blue ink, so no one blames you for stray pen marks. Online form. VoteWell.net |
|||
|
A Clock times: |
Issue(s) which came up and resolution. Details: People involved, sequence of events, "direct quotes in quote marks" |
||
|
B |
Date(s): |
Location(s): |
General type(s) of activity: voting, scanning, transport, etc.: |
|
C |
____Number of government staff present. Include title, names or descriptions when possible. ___ election staff ___ local officials ___ police ___ other |
||
|
D |
____Number of election contractors present. Names/descriptions, actions: |
||
|
E |
Other observers, press, candidates, etc. present. Some or all Names: |
||
|
F |
Do they handle ballots in batches? __Yes __No If yes, number per batch: _____envelopes or _____ballots or _____inches? About how many batches did you see?___ |
||
|
G |
Observer Name, Organization if any, email / phone: |
||
|
H |
(If you feel comfortable:) I declare under penalty of perjury that this page and any attachments are true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief. Executed Date: in (city & state): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Signature: |
||
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kk2QkGgY1HYtLoilFM-Li0vpOK8R9Egm/edit
Optional button to wear
