Observing Election Processing
Version 11/17/2025
Table of Contents
C. Election machines (voting, pollbook)
G. Processing after election night★
· Ordinary
citizens can watch election processing at the
elections office, and often online. Each state has its own rules.
· By
observing, you show staff that people care, you encourage better
procedures, and you can tell others how trustworthy the results are.
· Watch as
much as you can. Even if you don't know what the
process should look like, watching will teach you. Smile and
introduce yourself. Workers have a hard enough job without being frowned at.
Stay cool. If you raise your voice or get aggressive, you’ll be thrown out and
not see what you need to see. Don’t give them any reason to throw you out.
·
Find
allies
in your state. Send suggestions to admin@VoteWell.net
· Tips
on what
to watch for
That's all you really need to
start. There's extra
information below, if you have time, including a choice of forms
if you want to take notes.
Here are steps in the process.
Try to watch at least a little of each step.
1.
Testing some or all equipment for
each election
2.
Picking up, tracking, verifying envelopes
& ballots from USPS, drop boxes & polling places
3.
Processing accepted
ballots & cures of rejected ballots & transferring counts to web
4.
Auditing any aspects of election, and
certifying all the work to the state and public
If
you see anything that looks odd, ask which official to talk to. Even if you
don’t understand, check with a more experienced
organization or candidates before deciding
there’s a problem. If you do think there’s a problem after getting
explanations, tell local organizations, candidates,
866-our
vote (which is a
national team of election lawyers). Election workers who want to report
something wrong can get help from WhistleblowerAid.org. The US government has a form
(p.7).
Check what your state allows. Then learn from the local election office
website, then ask staff only the most important remaining questions. Be
reasonable, respectful, nice. Build an alliance with staff and reporters for
better elections. Some offices post announcements inside their office.
1.
40
states require advance accreditation for some steps, so check the
rules early.
Qualifications vary. Some
states require accreditation to watch centralized vote processing; some don't.
2.
Which steps of election processing
are open to public?
Only
WV
does not allow poll watching, but even there, election night counting,
canvassing and 3% hand counts are done in meetings of the County Commission,
open to the public.
3.
Have schedules been announced? When
will they be? If the schedule and meetings are not online, ask for that. Calls
show that people care. Summary
of
state schedules
4.
Can central processing and election board meetings be
observed online? If online, use sharpest possible video monitor. Where can you
get minutes of past meetings? Election board meetings are important and many
places can webcast them.
5.
In big rooms are binoculars allowed?
6.
Do they restrict the colors of observers' pens, to prevent
or identify source of stray marks?
7.
If your area still needs poll workers or other temporary staff,
consider applying. You won't see as widely as observers, but you can become
very familiar with the process and help it work.
8.
Maybe you can attend their
training for poll workers or signature verification? Especially if it is
online. Ask for manuals, which also may be online. If you find manuals online,
add them to the list.
9.
They may give you a visitor badge.
You can also wear
your own, so everyone knows you’re an observer, not a worker.
1.
Find
others
in your state
who observe elections, to share the work and help
each other report good and bad findings to officials, reporters, and wherever
they will make a difference. Search on web for allied poll-watching groups, ask
friends, candidates,
Election
Verification Network, other civic groups, unions, business groups, political
parties.
2.
Publicize the schedule of observable events to people and
groups you know. No one can watch everything. Starred items below may be most
important. Here are important things to watch
for, no matter when you go.
3.
Ask candidates to have volunteers observe everything.
4.
Many states allow
more access for partisan observers. Decide
whether to sign up with a candidate to be on their observer team.
ballotpedia.org/Sample_Ballot_Lookup
5.
Publicize
866-our-vote and/or your
local group to report problems.
6.
If you're a lawyer, is there a state
judge on
call for election issues? Can you have templates ready if
needed?
7.
When you observe, introduce yourself
to as many staff and observers as possible, try to write down their names and
sketch the layout of the room, to help your memory later.
Great
observation stories from Colorado:
http://electionquality.com/observed_elections/
Issues in Utah which observers could have caught, and observers from
legislative auditor’s office did observe
Stories from
CO, GA, NC on video ($2 for lifetime access):
15:30 Loading electronic files
from polling places by 1 person instead of 2
17:00 Need to object to
unreasonable restrictions on observers
22:30 Created manual to tell
police the public’s rights at election offices
23:55 Taking a printout of
short section of law allowing public observation; helps in some offices
26:00 Talking to staffer in
charge of random selection gradually improved what he did
31:30 Colorado changed from
public random selection to a video which could be non-random or could have been
recorded before the election
32:30 Usually see something
wrong, if not fixed may need to tell candidates
33:10 Los Angeles staff
opening vote by mail envelopes could see voter’s name and votes. Speaking to
boss led to putting envelopes with name down so no longer seen by staff
40:36 Hard to see in big room
44:04 A strategy is to watch one
ballot or batch moving through a big room, to be sure of every step. Noticed
envelopes had been opened in secret, & weren’t being scanned. Took 5 months
to get state to instruct counties that ballots must be scanned at same meeting
when envelopes were opened
45:50 In Cobb County GA, 2020
saw that hand counts being entered in computer to add them up had such slow
computer response staff could not tell if entered right.
48:17 In Fulton county, GA,
2020 not allowed to watch counts being entered in computer
48:55
Recommend Pentax
Papilio binoculars to see work a few feet away
better as well as distant
50:56 Try to get phone numbers
of officials to call about problems (e.g. ballots sorted in wrong piles)
51:36 Team interpreting marks
on electronic images of ballots where computer had trouble interpreting marks.
Some marks appeared without indication whether computer interpreted mark at
all. Turns out computer had ignored these marks. State has refused to adjust
brightness control in scanners which can solve the issue. Still in court on
this & other issues
56:20 Observers can’t prepare
for much of what you see; always new issues. Keep your eyes open, think, ask
persistently
56:45 Let staff know that
observers are witnesses who can help them by vouching for what goes well
59:15 If you can find poll
worker training & manuals for your area, you’ll see what workers are told
(not available for central office processes)
59:44 Ask staff if you can
attend wrapup meeting where staff discuss lessons
learned from each election
1:00:30 Being concerned about
election process is a good thing, but coming in with hostile attitude or chip
on a shoulder does not lead to better work
Compare state
rules on what
people can
watch:
and who can watch voting (other aspects may have similar
eligibility) https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watcher-qualifications.aspx
Partial list
of state handbooks:
https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/poll-watchers
Observers
quell rumors:
https://www.lwv.org/blog/observing-elections-and-protecting-voters-wisconsin
Republicans'
observers:
https://www.facebook.com/officialteamtrump/videos/264058754952383
Democrats'
observers:
https://arlingtondemocrats.org/start-making-difference-now/voter-protection/
Florida
precinct watchers' checklists and training:
http://www.ffec.org/election-monitoring-audits/
California
observation suggestions & links in 2012: https://countedascast.org/monitoring-elections/
California
election workers fearing hostile observers in 2024: https://calmatters.org/politics/2024/11/shasta-county-election-workers
Sample
schedule:
https://sfelections.sfgov.org/observe-election-process
Election
security issues:
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/Argonne-NL-2012-Suggestions-for-Better-Election-Security.pdf
US
government on insider
risks
Many places let people observe online without being in public and observe somewhere
they don’t live. Often they keep recordings of past elections posted.
· Texas requires 24/7 webcasts
in counties over 100,000 people (Texas dates)
· https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/advisory2022-10.shtml
· kxan.com/news/your-local-election-hq/how-to-watch-vote-counting-in-texas/
· https://www.fox7austin.com/news/how-to-live-stream-from-texas-election-offices
· Arizona
requires webcasts in all counties (Arizona dates)
· https://coppercourier.com/2020/10/16/livestream-election-ballot-counting-arizona/
· Individual
counties
· https://www.lavote.gov/home/voting-elections/current-elections/live-feed (California
dates)
· https://washoelife.washoecounty.gov/washoe-county/washoe-county-launches-livestream-video-of-ballot-room-for-duration-of-presidential-preference-primary/ (Nevada dates)
· https://adacounty.id.gov/elections/ballot-cameras/ (Idaho dates)
· kingcounty.gov/en/dept/elections/about-king-county/about-king-county-elections/security-and-accountability/watch-us-in-action (Washington
state dates)
· 2020
articles
· www.governing.com/now/live-on-webcams-election-officials-count-2020-ballots.html had
zoom list in 2020
· https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/04/1011648/livestream-vote-counts-are-here-to-stay
· In 2020,
South Korea livestreamed "the close of voting and the storing of the voted
ballots; the preparation and beginning of counting; the counting process as it
was progressing; and the close of the vote counting... South Korea’s efforts to
expand election observation opportunities for its 2020 elections made it easier
for its courts, experts, and the broader public to counter and dispel false
election narratives." https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/election-lessons/
You
can print the short form at bottom to note
names, times, events. This
will help you remember what you see, to discuss with others. Signature may let
lawyers use it under evidence
Rule
803(5).
Even if you don't know what
the people you watch should be doing, watching will teach you. Ask whom you
should approach if you see something off, so you don't interrupt the workers
and process.
1.
What changes in law does the election office want?
2.
Destroying old ballots and erasing
old electronic media after 22 months. (pages 75-79 of
https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download
"Originals must be retained" for 22 months under federal law)
3.
Find the advertisements for printing, mailing and election
machine contractors ("request for proposals" and contract decisions,
months ahead).
4.
Get copies of contracts. Just ask.
If they resist, state laws on open records are summarized at
https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/
You can get help submitting and tracking requests at:
https://www.muckrock.com/faq/#general
5.
Who has keys to storage
of election machines?
6.
Attend public presentations, if any.
7.
Very complete list from Michigan is
at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1M-q5vAV5jVfyjGamQj2mfiUHRtBwFA1r/view
8.
Public meeting to randomize order of candidates.
9.
When will designs be reviewed for ballots and envelopes? You
may want to offer suggestions.
10. How do they
proofread the ballots?
11.
Mailings of information to voters, if any.
12.
When will training material for temporary staff be updated?
You may want to offer suggestions.
13.
When are temporary staff hired?
14.
Can you get manuals for poll workers
& other staff. Just ask. If they resist, state laws on open records are
summarized at
https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/
You can get help submitting and tracking requests at:
https://www.muckrock.com/faq/#general
15.
Can you attend training for temporary central staff and poll
workers?
16.
Loading ballot definitions into
election machines. Done by staff or vendor?
17.
See also Chain of Custody section H, and check locks,
cameras, seal specifications, seal log designs
1.
Test includes hand-marked and machine-marked ballots if
jurisdiction allows both?
1.
BMD machines should each be tested with each data entry mode
(touch, audio, sip+puff, etc.) to check correct
operation.
2.
Tests use official ballots from printing company and from
ballot-on-demand printers if jurisdiction allows both, not perfect PDFs from
office printer?
3.
Tests include overvotes and undervotes?
4.
Tests that the machine ignores faint stray marks?
5.
Test procedure includes inserting ballots in all four
orientations (top/bottom/front/back)?
6.
Tests all candidates, with a different number of votes for
each to identify switched tallies? For example 3 ballots for Bush, 2 for Gore,
1 for Nader, will show if machine switches their tallies.
7.
Can observers see and get copies of test ballots? See
results?
8.
Model numbers of machines tested?
9.
Do machines have stickers saying certified by EAC (not
required in most states, but if so, you can check later if they’re true)
10. Is every
machine tested with every style of ballot that it needs to handle?
11.
Do staff write down any problems
(purpose is to find mistakes in programming and mechanical problems)? CA
example. Can you get the reports by public
records requests?
12.
2022
Comparison
of
state rules. It lists criteria & where each state stands:
Procedural Criteria for Logic &
Accuracy Tests
2.
Rules and Transparency (5 points).
1.
RT1 (1.5 pts): Detailed or step-by-step guidelines received
full credit, and general laws or policies received half credit.
2.
RT2 (1.0 pts): The document is readily available, e.g., via
the state’s website.
3.
RT3 (1.5 pts): Some testing is open to the public,
candidates/parties, journalists.
4.
RT4 (1.0 pts): Local jurisdictions have latitude to exceed
baseline requirements.
3.
Scope of Testing (5 points).
1.
ST1 (2.0 pts): All voting machines/scanners must be tested
before each election.
2.
ST2 (1.0 pts): All devices must be tested at a public event
before each election.
3.
ST3 (2.0 pts): All devices must be tested with every
applicable ballot design.
Functional Criteria for Logic &
Accuracy Tests
4.
Basic Protections (4 points).
1.
BP1 (1.0 pts): All choices receive at least one valid vote
during testing.
2.
BP2 (3.0 pts): No two choices in a contest receive the same
number of votes.
5.
Overvote Protection (2 points)
1.
OP1 (0.5 pts): At least one overvoted ballot is cast during
testing.
2.
OP2 (1.5 pts): For each contest c, a
test deck includes a ballot with nc selections and
one with nc+1 selections, where nc is the
permitted number of selections.
6.
Nondeterministic Testing (4 points). For stronger
protection against deliberate errors, attackers should be unable to predict how
the test deck is marked.
1.
ND1 (1.0 pts): Public observers are allowed to arbitrarily
mark and cast ballots.
2.
ND2 (3.0 pts): Some ballots must be marked using a source of
randomness.
13.
References, for Logic
& Accuracy Tests
1.
2006 Washburm
guide
for test decks
2.
2023 Manual from PA
3.
2024 Walker (Votebeat)
article on implementation
failures
in PA
4.
2024 Elections Group guide to whole
process
5.
2024 Crimmins, Halderman, Sturt
critique in parts 1-2 of a
paper
1.
Processing initial requests, if any
2.
Processing requests for replacement ballots
3.
Printing, addressing and mailing ballots (usually done by
contractors; you can ask for the contract)
4.
Receiving ballots, storage locations? Who has keys
overnight? Who watches security cameras? ★
· Article
on issues with storage:
http://losspreventionmedia.com/insider/retail-security/physical-security-threats-and-vulnerabilities/
· Procedures
& contracts to log mailed ballots: https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject%3Aabsentee-ballots-logs--c-212840%20
· Procedures
to process mailed ballots: https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject%3Aabsentee-ballot-processin-212581%20
5.
Cameras or staff at drop boxes? You
can observe from a distance, unobtrusively, without wearing or giving campaign
material or bothering voters. Article on drop boxes:
https://electionsgroup.com/assets/Ballot%20Drop%20Box%20Guide.pdf
6.
Emptying drop boxes and delivering to
central site. Numbered seals? Articles on issues with seals:
https://alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug12/Choose_Use_Seals.html
https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
Procedures: https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject%3Aelection-drop-boxes-211539%20
7.
Computer-checking signatures
8.
Hand-checking signatures
(specialized
form if you
wish)
9.
Supervisor review of initial hand
rejections. This is final, smallest step, so easiest to observe.★
10. Setting
aside rejected envelopes for voters to cure, if your state does so. Sending
cure notices to voters. Handling voter responses in person and by mail.
11.
Reviewing late arrivals for postmarks
12.
Pulling ballots from accepted envelopes. Are pens,
briefcases, bags forbidden? Do they restrict observers' pens? How do they
handle envelope with more than one ballot?
13.
Copying damaged ballots so they can
go through ballot scanners for counting★
14.
Sending and receiving UOCAVA
(military) + remote disability ballots. All offices accept military ballots by
email or fax on last days, a few let people with disabilities submit online.
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/internet-voting.aspx#Table
15.
Copying UOCAVA+disability voter
choices onto scannable ballots
16.
Sorting absentee ballots by precinct, if done
17.
Scanning and tallying absentee
ballots. Are pens, briefcases, bags forbidden? ★
1.
Delivery of election machines and blank ballot papers to
polling places:
1.
Who delivers? When are pick up & delivery? Can people
observe?
2.
Could the polling place owner or
anyone else access the machines and papers before the poll opens?★
2.
Picking up machines from polling places
1.
Do two people transport the machines and/or computer media
to central office?
1.
Who has keys? numbered seals? Are there
passwords on different machines? Where are they kept?
2.
General observation. If significant
problem or voters say machines switched their vote (staff may think voter
error), report to a central group in your jurisdiction and/or
866-our-vote, so they
can see if there's a pattern.
3.
Are campaigns, press, or outsiders
interfering with voters outside? Is
anyone
doing an exit poll outside?
4.
Is law enforcement or ICE around inside or outside?
5.
Opening and closing each day
1.
Arrival time of poll workers, open to public? Ballot boxes
empty? Ballots+machines arrive with seals? Machines
showing zero?
2.
General observation. If significant
problem or voters say machines switched their vote (staff may think voter
error), report to a central group in your jurisdiction and/or
866-our-vote, so they
can see if there's a pattern.
3.
Watch for malfunctions of machines, memory devices, access
by vendors
4.
If you want to count voters checking in at some point in the
day, you might ask pollworkers before and after you
start how many voters they've checked in, to be sure their records are growing
in line with the arriving voters.
5.
Are campaigns, press, or outsiders
interfering with voters outside? Is
anyone
doing an exit poll outside?
6.
Write down if there are uniformed police? ICE? Other law
enforcement? Inside or outside?
7.
Are closing procedures well organized? Ask and write down
how many provisional ballots and ordinary ballots were issued. Poll workers
track these numbers from the sign-in book or poll book, not the voting system.
They should be very close to the number of votes. People can see decisions on
provisional ballots in step G1.
8.
Photograph poll tape if tallied at
precinct. There are ideas at
https://www.protectourvotes.com/photo-finish/
and
https://democracycounts.org/actual-vote/
and
ValidateTheVoteUSA.org . Check
later whether totals in your photo match election day totals published for that
precinct.
9.
Carrying ballots + memory cards from polling places to
central office
1.
Is there a practice session for election day or election
night?
2.
Central office handling requests from precincts on election
morning and election day
3.
Copying into central memory the memory devices from
precincts, early voting, absentees, UOCAVA, disability. Seals?
4.
How do they prevent someone palming a new memory device into
the system instead of the true one?
5.
Scanning and tallying ballots. How do they track groups of
ballots to ensure each is scanned once and only once?
6.
Watch for malfunctions of machines, memory devices, access
by vendors
7.
Whenever staff have access to ballots, are purses,
backpacks, etc. kept out of reach, and black pens forbidden?
8.
When a ballot jams or otherwise fails to read, where does it
go next? How is the rest of the batch handled?
9.
Re-reading ballots in case of problems?
10. Transferring
results to internet/public. How do they prevent the internet infecting the
central election machines?
11.
(At home) Screen capture each time
election results update. Every 45 minutes you can save the page to https://wayback-api.archive.org/save
There are always rumors that some candidates' votes decrease, which should
never happen, though they may shift between mail, in-person, etc. when staff
correct errors. You can disprove (or prove) the rumors. You can also capture
video on phone or computer with Windows+G on Windows,
QuickTime on Mac, or
other
programs.
1.
Watch for malfunctions of machines, memory devices, access
by vendors.
2.
Processing provisional ballots; Public decisions? Good
reasons to accept or reject?
3.
When the election board meets: Are
all members present & paying attention? Others present? Space & sound
OK? Accessible? Start on time? Stick to agenda? Length? Public comments?
Adequate discussion & explanation? Everyone acts courteously? (optional
forms at end of LWV
guide or use general form at end of this
document)
4.
Adjudicating ballots with ambiguous votes, which the scanner
set aside.
5.
Re-creating by hand ballots which were torn or otherwise
failed to go through scanner. Also applies to voters who use Federal Write-in
Absentee Ballot (FWAB), which is standard nationally, but doesn’t match any
particular jurisdiction's ballot format. . Should be teams of at least two,
where both see original marks and new ballot (1 person reading old ballot to 1
person who marks new ballot, has no check on either). Team should write a
number on each re-created ballot and its original ballot, so they can be
checked later. Is it possible to photo-copy some damaged ballots onto paper of
the correct size & weight to scan, instead of hand-marking?
6.
Audit
(checking machine counts) if your area does one: selecting random sample,
getting ballots from storage, re-tallying them by hand? by machines? Votes
visible to public?
Hand tally sheets published online?
https://verifiedvoting.org/publication/checking-the-paper-record-a-guide-for-public-oversight-of-tabulation-audits-2/ (specialized
form if you wish)
7.
Certifying the results.
States
vary.
8.
Boxing ballots for storage, seals+keys? Map of state
rules
on access to ballots and ballot images.
9.
Recount, if any. This will be similar to steps F and G
above. Details will depend on state law, and will include close observation by
the candidates involved in the recount.
1.
When staff open a sealed container, do they check seal
number matches a seal log?
2.
When staff seal a container, do they enter seal number in a
seal log?
3.
How is the seal log transported and secured?
4.
Ballot reconciliation (usually before or during canvass
meeting). Expect differences of 1 to 3 ballots, from mis-counts by tired
poll-workers
1.
For each precinct do they track number of election-day
voters checked in = ballots in box + provisionals =
in-person election results + rejected provisionals?
2.
Similar checks for early voting.
3.
For mail & drop boxes, do they track number of envelopes
= mail results + rejected envelopes?
4.
Do they report election day separately from early voting and
mail, for each precinct, so the counts can be checked?
5.
Can you get all these totals for some or all precincts?
5.
Locks on ballot storage? (info on locks)
1.
Number of locks with different keys?
2.
Who has those keys?
3.
Are there electronic logs of whose keycard or combination
opens at what times?
4.
Is there a unique entry code for each person?
5.
Are the logs public?
6.
How secure from erasure and alteration are those logs?
7.
Is there literature on how easy to pick this model of lock
is? (All physical & electronic locks are pickable, small and cheap ones
usually easiest)
6.
Seals on stored ballots? (info on seals)
1.
Is there literature on how hard it is to remove and replace
your seals without detection?
2.
Is it possible to order extra seals with the same numbers?
3.
Can the item be opened without damaging the seal (eg zip ties can be opened by a knife point holding down the
tab away from the indentations)
4.
Can you get used seals or new seals to check out?
7.
Security cameras on ballot storage?
(info on cameras
& security equipment)
1.
Is there literature on how hackable your security cameras
are?
2.
When did a security expert last examine the security cameras
for hacking?
3.
Who watches the security camera footage?
4.
Is the security camera footage online?
8.
Security on other election records, like seal logs, and
precinct reports of how many people voted?
1.
(same questions as above)
9.
Does the election system calculate
hash values of ballot images, cast vote records, and other electronic files? (A
hash value is a fixed-length string of numbers and letters generated from a
mathematical algorithm and is unique to the file being hashed, as defined in CISA
ST04-018)
1.
Are the hash values public?
2.
Does anyone check if files during the final canvass have the
same hash values as originally calculated?
10. EAC
advises, “Every election office should have written chain of custody procedures
available for public inspection prior to every election.” Most offices don’t,
but you can quote that and ask. The rest of that EAC advice absurdly focuses on
paper signatures, not locks & guards.
More
thorough tips on observing audits are at docs.google.com/document/d/11qSTJNZqfoPxG6HuRTf-Hw5euA4bG5QQEmlRuf34WAY/edit?tab=t.0
States
have different
methods of auditing.
These steps apply:
1.
Do they give the public the election system’s results for
each batch before random selection & audit, to prevent later changes?
(rare)
2.
Selecting random sample: Taking numbers from a bowl leaves
doubt whether every item had one slip of paper. Can you see all slips of paper?
Picking by getting random numbers from a computer program can be ok, but won’t
convince doubters that program isn’t hacked.
3.
The most transparent is to pick
items from a numbered list by throwing two or three 10-sided dice numbered 0-9,
00-90, and 000-900. Can you get the
numbered list to see that it's complete? You can ask a few weeks ahead about
their method & offer to order 10-sided dice, delivered directly to office,
if they’re open to that. Explanation: https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/dice-wote06.pdf
How California mis-uses dice is in the appendix of https://www.calvoter.org/sites/default/files/comments-regs-cvf-bc-ccc-vv-june302023.pdf
4.
Getting ballots from storage: can you watch? Does it happen
as soon as sample is chosen, to avoid doubt about them being changed? (both
rare)
5.
Can you see the entire paper flow to
be clear everything which needs to be handled is handled once, and goes on to
storage? (common in small offices) Graphic of good & bad visibility: https://californiaglobe.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ACROV_Review.jpg
6.
Retallying paper ballots by machines? by hand? Split between
2 teams so they don’t know totals to match? Teams of 3 or 4 so 2 read & 2
tally?
7.
Votes visible to public? (rare)
8.
Reading totals from tally sheets is error-prone: Can you
check? Copies for public? (rare, but may be permitted in small & friendly
offices)
9.
What do they do when totals don’t
match? ★
★ Starred items may be most important
to observe. And watch
for these, no matter when you go.
|
Notes on an Observer’s Shift: On back or new page, sketch room
to remember it. Avoid black or blue ink, so no one blames you for stray pen
marks. Online form. VoteWell.net |
|||
|
A Clock times: |
Issue(s)
which came up and resolution. Details: People involved, sequence of events, "direct quotes in
quote marks" |
||
|
B |
Date(s): |
Location(s): |
General type(s) of activity:
voting, scanning, transport, etc.: |
|
C |
____Number
of government staff present. Include title,
names or descriptions when possible. ___ election staff ___ local
officials ___ police ___ other |
||
|
D |
____Number of election
contractors present. Names/descriptions, actions: |
||
|
E |
Other observers, press,
candidates, etc. present. Some or all Names: |
||
|
F |
Do they handle ballots in
batches? __Yes __No
If yes, number per batch: _____envelopes or
_____ballots or _____inches? About how many batches did you see?___ |
||
|
G |
Observer Name, Organization
if any, email / phone: |
||
|
H |
(If
you feel comfortable:) I declare under penalty of perjury that this page and
any attachments are true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Executed Date: in
(city & state): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Signature: |
||
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kk2QkGgY1HYtLoilFM-Li0vpOK8R9Egm/edit
Optional button
to wear
