Observing
Election Processing
Version
4/1/2026
Contents
AA. Immediately before elections
AB. Logic+accuracy tests (LAT)
C. Election machines (voting,
pollbook)
G. Processing after election night★
·
Ordinary citizens can watch election
processing at the elections office, and often online. Each state has its own rules.
·
By observing, you show staff that
people care, you encourage better procedures, and you can tell others how
trustworthy the results are.
·
Watch as much as you can. Even if
you don't know what the process should look like, watching will teach you.
Smile and introduce yourself. Workers have a hard enough job without being
frowned at. Stay cool. If you raise your voice or get aggressive, you’ll be
thrown out and not see what you need to see. Don’t give them any reason to
throw you out.
·
Find allies
in your state. Send suggestions to admin@VoteWell.net
·
Tips on what to watch for
That's
all you really need to start. There's extra information below, if you have
time, including a choice of forms if you want to take notes.
Here
are steps in the process. Try to watch at least a little of each step.
1.
Testing some or all equipment for
each election
2.
Picking up, tracking, verifying
envelopes & ballots from USPS, drop boxes & polling places
3.
Processing accepted ballots &
cures of rejected ballots & transferring counts to web
4.
Auditing any aspects of election,
and certifying all the work to the state and public
If you see
anything that looks odd, ask which official to talk to. Even if you don’t
understand, check with a more experienced organization
or candidates before deciding there’s a problem. If you do think there’s a
problem after getting explanations, tell local organizations, candidates, 866-our
vote (which is a national team of election lawyers). Election workers who
want to report something wrong can get help from WhistleblowerAid.org.
The US government has a form
(p.7).
Check
what your state allows. Then learn from the local election office website, then
ask staff only the most important remaining questions. Be reasonable,
respectful, nice. Build an alliance with staff and reporters for better
elections. Some offices post announcements inside their office.
1. 40
states require advance accreditation for
some steps, so check the rules early. Qualifications
vary. Some states require accreditation to watch centralized vote processing;
some don't.
2. Which
steps of election processing are open to public? Only
WV does not allow poll watching, but even there, election night counting,
canvassing and 3% hand counts are done in meetings of the County Commission,
open to the public.
3. Have
schedules been announced? When will they be? If the schedule and meetings are
not online, ask for that. Calls show that people care. Summary
of state schedules
4. Can
central processing and election board meetings be observed online? If online,
use sharpest possible video monitor. Where can you get minutes of past
meetings? Election board meetings are important and many places can webcast
them.
5. In
big rooms are binoculars allowed?
6. Do
they restrict the colors of observers' pens, to prevent or identify source of
stray marks?
7. If
your area still needs poll workers or other temporary staff, consider applying.
You won't see as widely as observers, but you can become very familiar with the
process and help it work.
8. Maybe
you can attend their training for poll workers or signature verification?
Especially if it is online. Ask for manuals, which also may be online. If you
find manuals online, add them to the list.
9. They
may give you a visitor badge. You can also wear your own, so everyone knows you’re an
observer, not a worker.
1. Find others
in your state
who observe elections, to share the work and help each other report good
and bad findings to officials, reporters, and wherever they will make a
difference. Search on web for allied poll-watching groups, ask friends,
candidates, Election
Verification Network, other civic groups, unions, business groups,
political parties.
2. Publicize
the schedule of observable events to people and groups you know. No one can
watch everything. Starred items below may be most important. Here are important
things to watch
for, no matter when you go.
3. Ask
candidates to have volunteers observe everything.
4. Many
states allow
more access for partisan observers. Decide whether to sign up with a
candidate to be on their observer team. ballotpedia.org/Sample_Ballot_Lookup
5. Publicize 866-our-vote
and/or your local group to report problems.
6. If
you're a lawyer, is there a state judge on
call for election issues? Can you have templates ready if needed?
7. When
you observe, introduce yourself to as many staff and observers as possible, try
to write down their names and sketch the layout of the room, to help your
memory later.
Great
observation stories from Colorado: http://electionquality.com/observed_elections/
Issues
in Utah which observers could have caught, and observers from legislative
auditor’s office did observe
Great
report by Harry Hursti on some polling places and central Election Preparation
Center (EPC) Pp.3-19 of https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.809.3_2.pdf
Stories
from CO, GA, NC on video
($2 for lifetime access):
15:30
Loading electronic files from polling places by 1 person instead of 2
17:00
Need to object to unreasonable restrictions on observers
22:30
Created manual to tell police the public’s rights at election offices
23:55
Taking a printout of short section of law allowing public observation; helps in
some offices
26:00
Talking to staffer in charge of random selection gradually improved what he did
31:30
Colorado changed from public random selection to a video which could be
non-random or could have been recorded before the election
32:30
Usually see something wrong, if not fixed may need to tell candidates
33:10
Los Angeles staff opening vote by mail envelopes could see voter’s name and
votes. Speaking to boss led to putting envelopes with name down so no longer
seen by staff
40:36
Hard to see in big room
44:04
A strategy is to watch one ballot or batch moving through a big room, to be
sure of every step. Noticed envelopes had been opened in secret, & weren’t
being scanned. Took 5 months to get state to instruct counties that ballots
must be scanned at same meeting when envelopes were opened
45:50
In Cobb County GA, 2020 saw that hand counts being entered in computer to add
them up had such slow computer response staff could not tell if entered right.
48:17
In Fulton county, GA, 2020 not allowed to watch counts being entered in
computer
48:55
Recommend Pentax
Papilio binoculars to see work a few feet away better as well as distant
50:56
Try to get phone numbers of officials to call about problems (e.g. ballots
sorted in wrong piles)
51:36
Team interpreting marks on electronic images of ballots where computer had
trouble interpreting marks. Some marks appeared without indication whether
computer interpreted mark at all. Turns out computer had ignored these marks.
State has refused to adjust brightness control in scanners which can solve the
issue. Still in court on this & other issues
56:20
Observers can’t prepare for much of what you see; always new issues. Keep your
eyes open, think, ask persistently
56:45
Let staff know that observers are witnesses who can help them by vouching for
what goes well
59:15
If you can find poll worker training & manuals for your area, you’ll see
what workers are told (not available for central office processes)
59:44
Ask staff if you can attend wrapup meeting where staff discuss lessons learned
from each election
1:00:30
Being concerned about election process is a good thing, but coming in with
hostile attitude or chip on a shoulder does not lead to better work
Compare
state rules on what
people
can watch: and who can watch voting (other aspects
may have similar eligibility) https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watcher-qualifications.aspx
Partial
list of state handbooks: https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/poll-watchers
Observers
quell rumors: https://www.lwv.org/blog/observing-elections-and-protecting-voters-wisconsin
Republicans'
observers: https://www.facebook.com/officialteamtrump/videos/264058754952383
Democrats'
observers: https://arlingtondemocrats.org/start-making-difference-now/voter-protection/
Florida
precinct watchers' checklists and training: http://www.ffec.org/election-monitoring-audits/
California
observation suggestions & links in 2012: https://countedascast.org/monitoring-elections/
California
election workers fearing hostile observers in 2024: https://calmatters.org/politics/2024/11/shasta-county-election-workers
Sample
schedule: https://sfelections.sfgov.org/observe-election-process
Election
security issues: https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/Argonne-NL-2012-Suggestions-for-Better-Election-Security.pdf
US
government on insider
risks
Many places
let people observe online without being in public and observe somewhere they
don’t live. Often they keep recordings of past elections posted.
·
Texas requires 24/7 webcasts in counties over
100,000 people (Texas dates)
·
https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/advisory2022-10.shtml
·
kxan.com/news/your-local-election-hq/how-to-watch-vote-counting-in-texas/
·
https://www.fox7austin.com/news/how-to-live-stream-from-texas-election-offices
·
Arizona requires webcasts in all
counties (Arizona dates)
·
https://coppercourier.com/2020/10/16/livestream-election-ballot-counting-arizona/
·
Individual counties
·
https://www.lavote.gov/home/voting-elections/current-elections/live-feed
(California dates)
§ https://washoelife.washoecounty.gov/washoe-county/washoe-county-launches-livestream-video-of-ballot-room-for-duration-of-presidential-preference-primary/
(Nevada dates)
§ https://adacounty.id.gov/elections/ballot-cameras/
(Idaho dates)
§ kingcounty.gov/en/dept/elections/about-king-county/about-king-county-elections/security-and-accountability/watch-us-in-action
(Washington state dates)
·
2020 articles
·
www.governing.com/now/live-on-webcams-election-officials-count-2020-ballots.html
had zoom list in 2020
·
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/04/1011648/livestream-vote-counts-are-here-to-stay
·
In 2020, South Korea livestreamed "the
close of voting and the storing of the voted ballots; the preparation and
beginning of counting; the counting process as it was progressing; and the
close of the vote counting... South Korea’s efforts to expand election
observation opportunities for its 2020 elections made it easier for its courts,
experts, and the broader public to counter and dispel false election narratives."
https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/election-lessons/
You
can print the short form at bottom to note names, times, events. This will help
you remember what you see, to discuss with others. Signature may let lawyers
use it under evidence Rule
803(5).
Even if you
don't know what the people you watch should be doing, watching will teach you.
Ask whom you should approach if you see something off, so you don't interrupt
the workers and process.
1. What
changes in law does the election office want?
2. Destroying
old ballots and erasing old electronic media after 22 months. (pages 75-79 of https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download
"Originals must be retained" for 22 months under federal law)
3. Find
the advertisements for printing, mailing and election machine contractors
("request for proposals" and contract decisions, months ahead).
4. Get
copies of contracts. Just ask. If they resist, state laws on open records are
summarized at https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/
You can get help submitting and tracking requests at: https://www.muckrock.com/faq/#general
5. Who
has keys
to storage of election machines?
6. Attend
public presentations, if any.
1.
Very complete list from Michigan is
at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1M-q5vAV5jVfyjGamQj2mfiUHRtBwFA1r/view
2.
Public meeting to randomize order of
candidates.
3.
When will designs be reviewed for
ballots and envelopes? You may want to offer suggestions.
4.
How do they proofread the ballots?
5.
Mailings of information to voters,
if any.
6.
When will training material for
temporary staff be updated? You may want to offer suggestions.
7.
When are temporary staff hired?
8.
Can you get manuals for poll workers
& other staff. Just ask. If they resist, state laws on open records are
summarized at https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/
You can get help submitting and tracking requests at: https://www.muckrock.com/faq/#general
9.
Can you attend training for
temporary central staff and poll workers?
10.
Loading ballot definitions into
election machines. Done by staff or vendor?
11.
See also Chain of Custody section H,
and check locks, cameras, seal specifications, seal log designs
1.
Test includes hand-marked and
machine-marked ballots if jurisdiction allows both?
a)
Is each BMD machine tested with each
data entry mode (touch, audio, sip+puff, etc.) to check correct operation?
b)
Many jurisdictions use test ballots machine-created
by voting machine vendor. Others use "Automated Test Deck" software
from the vendor to generate the wide variety of ballots needed.
c)
Sites using Liberty/Dominion may use
"Vote Simulation Script" to generate image
files to process, without putting them on paper at all.
d)
Are test ballots marked TEST so audit
or recount can detect if they're left in ballot boxes, or created mid-election?
(Hursti:
“on multiple machines, while voters were attempting to vote, the ballot marking
devices sometimes printed ‘test’ ballots.”)
2. Tests
use official ballots from printing company and from ballot-on-demand printers
if jurisdiction allows both, not perfect PDFs from office printer?
3.
Tests include overvotes and
undervotes?
4.
Tests that the machine ignores faint
stray marks?
5.
Test procedure includes inserting
ballots in all four orientations (top/bottom/front/back)?
6.
Tests all candidates, with a
different number of votes for each to identify switched tallies? For example 3
ballots for Bush, 2 for Gore, 1 for Nader, will show if machine switches their
tallies.
7.
Is every machine tested with every
style of ballot that it needs to handle?
8.
Do staff write down any problems
(purpose is to find mistakes in programming and mechanical problems)? CA
example.
9.
Can you get the reports by asking,
or by public records requests?
10.
Can observers see and get copies of
test ballots? See results?
11.
Model numbers of machines tested?
References,
for Logic & Accuracy Tests
5. Specialized form if you wish
6. 2022 Bartels research on Automated
Test Decks and Vote Simulation Scripts and risk of altering results by not removing
test ballots from memory or from ballot boxes. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=4137802
7. 2006
Washburn guide
for test decks
8. 2023
Manual from PA
9. 2024
Walker (Votebeat) article on implementation
failures in PA
10. 2024
Elections Group guide to whole
process
11. 2024
Crimmins, Halderman, Sturt critique in parts 1-2 of a
paper
12. 2022
Comparison
of state rules.
This paper from the U of Michigan shows how they scored each state:
|
Procedural Criteria for
Logic & Accuracy Tests 2. Rules
and Transparency (5 points). 1. RT1
(1.5 pts): Detailed or step-by-step guidelines received full credit, and
general laws or policies received half credit. 2. RT2
(1.0 pts): State document is readily available, e.g., via the state’s
website. 3. RT3
(1.5 pts): Some testing is open to the public, candidates/parties,
journalists. 4. RT4
(1.0 pts): Local jurisdictions have latitude to exceed baseline requirements. 3. Scope
of Testing (5 points). 1. ST1
(2.0 pts): All voting machines/scanners must be tested before each election. 2. ST2
(1.0 pts): All devices must be tested at a public event before each election. 3. ST3
(2.0 pts): All devices must be tested with every applicable ballot design. |
|
Functional Criteria for
Logic & Accuracy Tests 4. Basic
Protections (4 points). 1. BP1
(1.0 pts): All choices receive at least one valid vote during testing. 2. BP2
(3.0 pts): No two choices in a contest receive the same number of votes. 5. Overvote
Protection (2 points) 1. OP1
(0.5 pts): At least one overvoted ballot is cast during testing. 2. OP2
(1.5 pts): For each contest c, a test deck includes a ballot with nc
selections and one with nc+1 selections, where nc is the permitted number of
selections. 6. Nondeterministic
Testing (4 points). For stronger protection against deliberate errors,
attackers should be unable to predict how the test deck is marked. 1. ND1
(1.0 pts): Public observers are allowed to arbitrarily mark and cast ballots. 2. ND2
(3.0 pts): Some ballots must be marked using a source of randomness. |
·
“A
‘hash’...
is a… string of numbers and letters generated from a mathematical algorithm and
a… file.... This generated string is unique to the file being hashed.”
·
“Your
voting system vendor has instructions
for generating hashes from your voting system and the voting system equipment,
and comparing them with the trusted hashes.” “If the two do not match,you need
to investigate why... At minimum,before you conduct an election on that
equipment, be sure to reinstall the software from a trusted source.” “Hashing
every individual voting device before each election may not be feasible, but
you should perform a hash validation of a representative sample of your voting
system equipment.”
·
“Some
states
have specific requirements for testing and frequency. In some states, hash
testing is voluntary… Ideally, the staff at each jurisdiction should understand
their equipment and systems well enough to perform local testing… Adding third
parties to chain of custody may create actual or perceived security
vulnerabilities.”
·
Hart
has BIOS check the operating system and software. Appel suggests
(pp.25-28) “hash all the static partitions” to check that a bad BIOS hasn’t
changed the operating system, on a random sample of machines.
·
“a
number of hash checks conducted on ES&S software failed
verification, but ES&S withheld this information from the secretary of
state’s office because it deemed the failures to be insignificant.”
Hash
checking happens in CA, NY, PA
(only in Delaware County), TX
(form),
VA.
1. Which machines were tested? If
not all, were they randomly selected? How much time would it take to test all?
2. Who tested them?
3. Did they use testing software
already inside the machine? If not, where did they get it?
4. Can you get the reports by
asking, or by public records
requests?
5. What kinds and how many locks and
seals protect machines from changes until the election is over? Can
you buy copies of the locks and seals to test?
1.
Processing initial requests, if any
2.
Processing requests for replacement
ballots
3.
Printing, addressing and mailing
ballots (usually done by contractors; you can ask for the contract)
4.
Receiving ballots, storage locations? Who has keys
overnight? Who watches security cameras? ★
a)
Article on issues with storage: http://losspreventionmedia.com/insider/retail-security/physical-security-threats-and-vulnerabilities/
b)
Procedures & contracts to log
mailed ballots: https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject%3Aabsentee-ballots-logs--c-212840%20
c)
Procedures to process mailed
ballots: https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject%3Aabsentee-ballot-processin-212581%20
5.
Cameras or staff at drop boxes? You
can observe from a distance, unobtrusively, without wearing or giving campaign
material or bothering voters. Article on drop boxes: https://electionsgroup.com/assets/Ballot%20Drop%20Box%20Guide.pdf
6.
Emptying drop boxes and delivering
to central site. Numbered seals? Articles on issues with seals: https://alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug12/Choose_Use_Seals.html https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
Procedures: https://www.documentcloud.org/app?q=%2Bproject%3Aelection-drop-boxes-211539%20
7.
Computer-checking signatures
8.
Hand-checking signatures
(specialized form
if you wish)
9.
Supervisor review of initial hand
rejections. This is final, smallest step, so easiest to observe.★
10.
Setting aside rejected envelopes for
voters to cure, if your state does so. Sending cure notices to voters. Handling
voter responses in person and by mail.
11.
Reviewing late arrivals for
postmarks
12.
Pulling ballots from accepted
envelopes. Are pens, briefcases, bags forbidden? Do they restrict observers'
pens? How do they handle envelope with more than one ballot?
13.
Copying damaged ballots so they can
go through ballot scanners for counting★
14.
Sending and receiving UOCAVA
(military) + remote disability ballots. All offices accept military ballots by
email or fax on last days, a few let people with disabilities submit online. https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/internet-voting.aspx#Table
15.
Copying UOCAVA+disability voter
choices onto scannable ballots
16.
Sorting absentee ballots by
precinct, if done
17.
Scanning and tallying absentee
ballots. Are pens, briefcases, bags forbidden? ★
1. Delivery
of election machines and blank ballot papers to polling places:
a) Who
delivers? When are pick up & delivery? Can people observe?
b) Could
the polling place owner or anyone else access the machines and papers before
the poll opens?★
2. Picking
up machines from polling places
a) Do
two people transport the machines and/or computer media to central office?
1.
Who has keys? numbered seals?
Are there passwords on different machines? Where are they kept?
2.
General observation. If significant
problem or voters say machines switched their vote (staff may think voter
error), report to a central group in your jurisdiction and/or 866-our-vote,
so they can see if there's a pattern.
3.
Are campaigns, press, or outsiders
interfering with voters outside? Is anyone
doing an exit poll outside?
4.
Is law enforcement or ICE around
inside or outside?
5.
Opening and closing each day
1.
Arrival time of poll workers, open
to public? Ballot boxes empty? Ballots+machines arrive with seals? Machines
showing zero?
2.
General observation. If significant
problem or voters say machines switched their vote (staff may think voter
error), report to a central group in your jurisdiction and/or 866-our-vote,
so they can see if there's a pattern.
3.
Watch for malfunctions of machines,
memory devices, access by vendors
4.
If you want to count voters checking
in at some point in the day, you might ask pollworkers before and after you
start how many voters they've checked in, to be sure their records are growing
in line with the arriving voters.
5.
Are campaigns, press, or outsiders
interfering with voters outside? Is anyone
doing an exit poll outside?
6.
Write down if there are uniformed
police? ICE? Other law enforcement? Inside or outside?
7.
Are closing procedures well
organized? Ask and write down how many provisional ballots and ordinary ballots
were issued. Poll workers track these numbers from the sign-in book or poll
book, not the voting system. They should be very close to the number of votes.
People can see decisions on provisional ballots in step G1.
8.
Photograph poll tape if tallied at
precinct. There are ideas at https://www.protectourvotes.com/photo-finish/
and https://democracycounts.org/actual-vote/
and ValidateTheVoteUSA.org
. Check later whether totals in your photo match election day totals published
for that precinct.
9.
Carrying ballots + memory cards from
polling places to central office
1.
Is there a practice session for
election day or election night?
2.
Central office handling requests
from precincts on election morning and election day
3.
Copying into central memory the
memory devices from precincts, early voting, absentees, UOCAVA, disability.
Seals?
4.
How do they prevent someone palming
a new memory device into the system instead of the true one?
5.
Scanning and tallying ballots. How
do they track groups of ballots to ensure each is scanned once and only once?
6.
Watch for malfunctions of machines,
memory devices, access by vendors
7.
Whenever staff have access to
ballots, are purses, backpacks, etc. kept out of reach, and black pens
forbidden?
8.
When a ballot jams or otherwise
fails to read, where does it go next? How is the rest of the batch handled?
9.
Re-reading ballots in case of
problems?
10.
Transferring results to
internet/public. How do they prevent the internet infecting the central
election machines?
11.
(At home) Screen capture each time
election results update. Every 45 minutes you can save the page to https://wayback-api.archive.org/save
There are always rumors that some candidates' votes decrease, which should
never happen, though they may shift between mail, in-person, etc. when staff
correct errors. You can disprove (or prove) the rumors. You can also capture
video on phone or computer with Windows+G on Windows, QuickTime on Mac, or other
programs.
1.
Watch for malfunctions of machines,
memory devices, access by vendors.
2.
Processing provisional ballots;
Public decisions? Good reasons to accept or reject?
3.
When the election board meets: Are
all members present & paying attention? Others present? Space & sound
OK? Accessible? Start on time? Stick to agenda? Length? Public comments?
Adequate discussion & explanation? Everyone acts courteously? (optional
forms at end of LWV
guide or use general form at end of this document)
4.
Adjudicating ballots with ambiguous
votes, which the scanner set aside.
5.
Re-creating by hand ballots which
were torn or otherwise failed to go through scanner. Also applies to voters who
use Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB), which is standard nationally, but
doesn’t match any particular jurisdiction's ballot format. . Should be teams of
at least two, where both see original marks and new ballot (1 person reading
old ballot to 1 person who marks new ballot, has no check on either). Team
should write a number on each re-created ballot and its original ballot, so
they can be checked later. Is it possible to photo-copy some damaged ballots
onto paper of the correct size & weight to scan, instead of hand-marking?
6.
Audit
(checking machine counts) if your area does one: selecting random sample,
getting ballots from storage, re-tallying them by hand? by machines? Votes
visible to public? Hand tally sheets published online?
a)
https://verifiedvoting.org/publication/checking-the-paper-record-a-guide-for-public-oversight-of-tabulation-audits-2/
(specialized form
if you wish)
7.
Certifying the results. States
vary.
8.
Boxing ballots for storage,
seals+keys? Map of state rules
on access to ballots and ballot images.
9.
Recount, if any. This will be
similar to steps F and G above. Details will depend on state law, and will
include close observation by the candidates involved in the recount.
1.
When staff open a sealed container,
do they check seal number matches a seal log?
2.
When staff seal a container, do they
enter seal number in a seal log?
3.
How is the seal log transported and
secured?
4.
Ballot reconciliation (usually
before or during canvass meeting). Expect differences of 1 to 3 ballots, from
mis-counts by tired poll-workers
a) For
each precinct do they track number of election-day voters checked in = ballots
in box + provisionals = in-person election results + rejected provisionals?
b) Similar
checks for early voting.
c) For
mail & drop boxes, do they track number of envelopes = mail results +
rejected envelopes?
d) Do
they report election day separately from early voting and mail, for each
precinct, so the counts can be checked?
e) Can
you get all these totals for some or all precincts?
5. Locks
on ballot storage? (info on locks)
a) Number
of locks with different keys?
b) Who
has those keys?
c) Are
there electronic logs of whose keycard or combination opens at what times?
d) Is
there a unique entry code for each person?
e) Are
the logs public?
f) How
secure from erasure and alteration are those logs?
g) Is
there literature on how easy to pick this model of lock is? (All physical &
electronic locks are pickable, small and cheap ones usually easiest)
6. Seals
on stored ballots? (info on seals)
a) Is
there literature on how hard it is to remove and replace your seals without
detection?
b) Is
it possible to order extra seals with the same numbers?
c) Can
the item be opened without damaging the seal (eg zip ties can be opened by a
knife point holding down the tab away from the indentations)
d) Can
you get used seals or new seals to check out?
7. Security
cameras on ballot storage? (info
on cameras & security equipment)
a) Is
there literature on how hackable your security cameras are?
b) When
did a security expert last examine the security cameras for hacking?
c) Who
watches the security camera footage?
d) Is
the security camera footage online?
8. Security
on other election records, like seal logs, and precinct reports of how many
people voted?
a) (same
questions as above)
9. Does
the election system calculate hash values of ballot images, cast vote records,
and other electronic files? (A hash value is a fixed-length string of numbers
and letters generated from a mathematical algorithm and is unique to the file
being hashed, as defined in CISA
ST04-018)
a) Are
the hash values public?
b) Does
anyone check if files during the final canvass have the same hash values as
originally calculated?
10. EAC
advises, “Every election office should have written chain of custody procedures
available for public inspection prior to every election.” Most offices
don’t, but you can quote that and ask. The rest of that EAC advice absurdly
focuses on paper signatures, not locks & guards.
More
thorough tips on observing audits are at docs.google.com/document/d/11qSTJNZqfoPxG6HuRTf-Hw5euA4bG5QQEmlRuf34WAY/edit?tab=t.0
States
have different
methods of auditing. These steps apply:
1.
Do they give the public the election
system’s results for each batch before random selection & audit, to prevent
later changes? (rare)
2.
Selecting random sample: Throwing dice
is visibly fair. Taking numbers from a bowl leaves doubt whether every item had
one slip of paper. Can you see all slips of paper? Picking by getting random
numbers from a computer program can be ok, but won’t convince doubters that
program isn’t hacked.
3.
The most transparent is to pick
items from a numbered list by throwing two or three 10-sided dice numbered 0-9,
00-90, and 000-900. Can you get the
numbered list to see that it's complete? You can ask a few weeks ahead about
their method & offer to order 10-sided dice, delivered directly to office,
if they’re open to that. Explanation: https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/dice-wote06.pdf
How California mis-uses dice is in the appendix of https://www.calvoter.org/sites/default/files/comments-regs-cvf-bc-ccc-vv-june302023.pdf
4.
Getting ballots from storage: Can
you watch, or do staff livestream their trips in storage room? Does it happen
as soon as sample is chosen, to avoid doubt about them being changed? (both
rare)
5.
Can you see the entire paper flow to
be clear everything which needs to be handled is handled once, and goes on to
storage? (common in small offices) Graphic of good & bad visibility: https://californiaglobe.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ACROV_Review.jpg
6.
Retallying paper ballots by
machines? by hand? Each batch split between 2 teams so they don’t know totals
to match? Teams of 3 or 4
so 2 read & 2 tally?
7.
Votes visible to public? (rare)
8.
Reading totals from tally sheets is
error-prone: Can you check? Copies for public? (rare, but may be permitted in
small & friendly offices)
9.
What do they do when totals don’t
match? ★
★
Starred items may be most important to observe. And watch
for these, no matter when you go.
|
Notes on
an Observer’s Shift: On back or new page, sketch room to remember it. Avoid
black or blue ink, so no one blames you for stray pen marks. Online
form. VoteWell.net |
|||
|
A Clock
times: |
Issue(s)
which came up and resolution. Details: People involved, sequence of events,
"direct quotes in quote marks" |
||
|
B |
Date(s): |
Location(s): |
General
type(s) of activity: voting, scanning, transport, etc.: |
|
C |
____Number
of government staff present. Include title, names or descriptions when
possible. ___
election staff ___ local officials ___
police ___ other |
||
|
D |
____Number
of election contractors present. Names/descriptions, actions: |
||
|
E |
Other
observers, press, candidates, etc. present. Some or all Names: |
||
|
F |
Do
they handle ballots in batches?
__Yes __No If yes, number per batch: _____envelopes
or _____ballots or _____inches? About how many batches did you see?___ |
||
|
G |
Observer
Name, Organization if any, email / phone: |
||
|
H |
(If
you feel comfortable:) I declare under penalty of perjury that this page and
any attachments are true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Executed Date: in
(city & state): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Signature: |
||
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kk2QkGgY1HYtLoilFM-Li0vpOK8R9Egm/edit
Optional
button to wear
